Introductory remarks by Michael Calingaert

What is the state of the transatlantic relationship and where is it heading? My one sentence assessment is not that it is “alive and well” but that it is “alive and recovering”.

My point of departure is 2001, the beginning of the Bush Administration.  The most charitable characterization one can give of transatlantic relations during Bush’s first term is “bad”.  That relates to issues of substance and style.  The focal point, of course, became Iraq, where European governments were split over the American invasion but their publics were largely opposed.  In the quarrel that ensued between the United States and much of Europe, both sides made mistakes; certainly, unnecessarily inflammatory public pronouncements were made on both sides of the Atlantic. 

However, from the outset of Bush’s second term a change clearly has taken place in US attitudes and policies.  A conscious and concerted effort was made to mend fences, with the President and his Administration reaching out to Europe.  This was based, seemingly, on the growing recognition that it was in the US interest to work with Europe.  The policy shift represented the demise of the earlier hubris-inspired policy of working with those countries willing to accept US leadership and ignoring those who would not follow.  As Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns phrased it, the Administration saw to it that 2005 would be “a kinder, gentler year in transatlantic discourse”.

A key event was the President’s trip to Brussels in February 2005.  It was notable not only for the first official visit by a US president to the European Commission, but also for the rhetoric used by President Bush that reverted to the mainstream of traditional US post-World War II policy.  Indeed, some of the statements made by the President could have been made by any of his predecessors, something one could not have said of him during his first administration.

Importantly, this change in attitude was reciprocated by Europeans.  This especially reflected a general belief that failure in Iraq damages Western security and interests.  Nonetheless, this change in attitude has not resulted in major policy shifts.

In fact, one should not overvalue the new paradigm.  There is a tendency on the US side to brush aside the “unpleasantness” of the first term.  Merely repeating that “it is time to move on” does not in itself erase the bad feelings generated by the first Bush Administration.  In addition, the widespread unfavorable view of the United States remains a source of great concern.  The shift between 1999 and 2005, as measured in Pew polls, is striking: the favorable view dropped in France from 62% to 43%, in Germany from 78% to 41%, and in the United Kingdom from 83% to 55%.  Finally, this rapprochement comes at a time of weak political leadership in Europe, particularly in three of the “big four”, i.e. France, Italy, and the UK.  The exception is Angela Merkel.  While her accession to power is good news, Germany and the Franco-German axis play a lesser role in the now-enlarged EU of 25.

That brings us to the present.  It is characterized by three features:

First, the economic relationship is the underlying feature of the transatlantic relationship.  The United States and EU economies are enormous.  Together they account for over one-half of global GDP, as well as one-third of global trade in goods and almost one-half in services.  Their economies are deeply inter-twined.  Trade flows amount to $2 billion per day, the stock of investment by US companies in the EU and that of EU companies in the United States amount to $1.5 trillion each, the sales generated by these investments dwarf the value of trade, 12-13 million workers are employed by American and European subsidiaries on the other side of the Atlantic.  This economic relationship is characterized by a rough equivalence in the strength of the two partners.

On the government-to-government level, the United States and the EU work together on a broad agenda of economic issues, both bilateral and multilateral.  These range from efforts to bring about a convergence in their respective regulatory regimes to the multilateral trade negotiations in the Doha Round. 

Bilateral problems are invariably present, whether on trade or other economic issues such as environment, and some of them seem to fester endlessly, such as civil aircraft subsidies and trade in genetically-modified foods.  Many are contentious and affect important interests.  However, they account for a minor share of the overall relationship, and for the most part have been politically contained.

Second, political cooperation between the United States and the EU dates back to the 1970s and was formalized in the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990.  Unlike the economic sector, this relationship is basically an unequal partnership because of the EUs structure and the competences remaining in the member states.  Nonetheless, Europe is playing an increasingly important role.

The joint US-EU focus has shifted largely to areas beyond the transatlantic one.  An intense dialogue takes place on a wide-ranging agenda.  Hardly any region of the world is excluded from this dialogue.  The dialogue centers largely around efforts to enhance democracy and freedom and to promote security.  In a number of instances the common US-EU effort has been critical, notably negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and the Middle East peace process.  In addition, combined efforts have produced a measure of success in several other areas such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Lebanon/Syria, Sudan, and Ukraine.  The same is true with anti-terrorism efforts generally.

Third, there are a number of areas of potential conflict.  One is enlargement.  While enlargement fatigue has clearly set in within the EU member states and thus enthusiasm for expanding the borders farther east has diminished significantly, the United States remains a strong proponent of enlargement to include most of the Balkans and Turkey, a particularly sensitive issue for the EU.

Another is the role of NATO.  As Under Secretary of State Burns has said, “we continue to work through NATO as our transatlantic link.”  The US goal is to broaden NATO’s mandate and extend its global reach.  It does not consider the NATO-EU relationship a zero-sum game, whereas the EU prefers to work through the EU and considers NATO too narrowly focused to handle the full range of cooperation.  And a third is Iran, where we seem to be approaching the end of the negotiating process.

In conclusion, we continue to discover a truism: there exists a commonality of values, interests, and objectives between the United States and the EU.  Each needs the other despite periodic perceived disadvantages from the relationship.  It is not an ideal relationship, but it is effective and mutually beneficial.  Although that is not a unanimous view - there are people on both sides who perceive a threat from the other - we must recognize the need to thrash out our differences and come up with the most effective policies.

To end on a bipartisan note, I quote the Clinton Administration – “we are not clones, we are cousins,” said Madeleine Albright – and the Bush Administration – Nicholas Burns, who referred to our “long-term marriage with no possibility of separation or divorce.”  Both come to the same conclusion.