When looking for the next crop of politicians likely to shape Italian foreign policy in the coming years, it is remarkable how few fresh faces dot the crowd. The Italian Republic’s chronic reliance on septuagenarians and octogenarians for its political leadership has earned it the label of gerontocrazia. The current Prime Minister and President, Silvio Berlusconi (72) and Giorgio Napolitano (82), were elected at an age 15-20 years above that of most of their European counterparts. The exclusion of the younger demographic from Italian politics is no optical illusion. Although 27.5% of electorate (c. 14 million) is under 35 years old, just 6 out of 945 (0.7%) parliamentarians in the last chamber could say the same.This is in part the simple reflection of sinking birthrates and an ageing population: for the foreseeable future, around 70% of the electorate will be older than 45. The traditional method of leadership recruitment in the mass parties of the “First Republic” has not been replaced by analogous mechanisms in the new party spectrum. Previously, the path from party official to municipal appointee or elected official in the Chamber of Deputies was well worn. Now, political candidates are as likely to undergo real-world training outside the political parties, whether in local government, civil society associations or trade unions – or even in journalism or the judiciary.

This brief article considers the foreign policy views of a handful of the younger politicians who have gained visibility on the national stage. The professional trajectories of the young-ish politicians under examination here nonetheless testify to a slightly less dire crisis in elite recruitment than could be imagined. They are steeped in the rich political subcultures of the diverse Italian party spectrum, and some of the most recognizable names in post-war Italian politics have in fact godfathered influential up-and-comers: from the hard left, Fausto Bertinotti (Nichi Vendola, 49); to the center-right, Marco Pannella (Daniele Capezzone, 35); to the center-left, Romano Prodi (Enrico Letta, 41); and the right, Marcello Pera (Gaetano Quagliariello, 47).

This belated changing of the guard will naturally lead to some new diplomatic configurations and a generational reformulation and reassessment of postwar Italian foreign policy. But a close look at the positions of several of these politicians suggests that drastic departures are unlikely in the coming decade. Even the proudly Atlanticist politicians – of whom one finds many more in Italy than in France, Germany or the UK –openly criticize US handling of the war in Iraq. And many others are tepid if not outright cool towards US foreign policy. A significant number have supported a muscular Italian diplomacy and military action abroad, from Afghanistan to Lebanon (and, briefly, in Iraq). Most striking is the degree to which these voices are internationally-oriented – commercially and diplomatically, including at the local and regional levels.

∙Left

Nikita (Nichi) Vendola joined the Federation of Communist Youth (FGCI) at age 14 and he went on to co-found the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC) in 1991. Vendola’s thin margin of victory in Puglia’s regional presidential elections does not minimize the significance of electing of an openly gay man and Communist in a conservative region. Vendola is an outspoken internationalist. He has above all oriented his interests towards the Balkans and the Middle East. Vendola is pro-integration, but he has not waited for EU cover for his diplomatic activities: he engages his region with partnerships outside European borders on a bilateral basis. Vendola said in an interview that he hopes for his regional presidency to be the incarnation of what he calls good globalization: “All our efforts are guided towards fighting the fears of globalization as it seen only in its most dangerous aspects. We want to be the actors of a good globalization, which begins with reciprocal understanding.”

Vendola’s views can be described as generally pro-European. “Italy should help realize the dream of making Europe not only an economic union but also a political, democratic and peacemaking union, an open continent and not an armed fortress.”He is also hopeful for a greater foreign policy role for the EU in the Middle East: “Europe is the protagonist of dialogue and peace, not of infinite war” Vendola has spoken out in favor of Turkish accession of the EU,and his general attitude towards the Balkans is similarly open-armed: “We need to view the Balkans not simply as a market to be conquered, but as a strategic post for the future of Europe.” “Barroso’s decision to stop EU enlargement to other Eastern European countries after Romania and Bulgaria is myopic and mistaken… A truly united Europe cannot do without the direct involvement of the Balkans and Turkey. Blocking this unification process would … have dire consequences for its international political profile.” Moroever, Vendola has pursued an agenda based on a “common civilization” within the Mediterranean basin, from Albania to Syria.He has indulged in a vision of greater cooperation in the larger Mediterranean basin, and trumpets the unique role southern Italy has to play: “We represent the historical link between western and eastern civilizations.”

On the subject of transatlantic relations, Vendola said that “Italy and the US are linked by a deep friendship with longstanding roots, and together will have to confront with sincerity and in an open manner the divergences that can emerge over time between great democratic countries.” But he voiced skepticism of any military solution to the post- September 11th conflicts: “either we set aside arms and start discussions – as equals – with all of those who are considered to be ‘antagonists’ – or we declare war on half the planet. If we take the path of war, it will be very hard to turn back. Italy and Europe cannot be the minor vassals of such a plan.”

∙ Center-Left

Now a rising star on the center-left, Enrico Letta began his political career as a party activist in the Christian Democrats and Partito Popolare Italiano. Letta became the youngest government minister (for EU policy) in Italian republican history (in 1998), joining the Center-Left Ulivo coalition led by Massimo D’Alema. While a member of European parliament, Letta was Member of the Delegation for relations with the Arab Maghreb Union.He took over the position of undersecretary of state (2006-8) for Prime Minister Prodi from his uncle (Gianni Letta, who held the same position from 2001-6 and 2008-present) and unsuccessfully contested Walter Veltroni for leadership of the Partito Democratico in 2008.

Letta is a pragmatic advocate of a strong Italian role in the EU and he has maintained close ties with Arab countries, especially Libya. He has heavily invested his political capital in European integration, especially on the economic front, led the effort for the Euro within his party, and has also been supportive of strong European “neighborhood policy.” He argues that Italy, in particular, needs the impetus the EU provides: “Italy’s problem is due to the scarce internationalization of the country: globalization has gone forward throughout the world except in Italy. Italy alone…has lost the most ground in the past fifteen years.” Letta views European integration as being in a delicate and critical phase, and he has been critical of the EU’s “weak” political leadership. On his website, he discusses the importance of globalization and full integration into the EU for Italy’s national interests. He argues that Europe is starting to decline politically and to stagnate economically,and has argued for more powerful roles for the European Commission and the European Parliament.Letta was involved in attempts to amend the Italian constitution to insert an explicit reference to Italy’s membership in the EU.

Nonetheless, Letta voiced some reservations about the Maastricht Treaty’s limits on public spending and the EU stability pact. He called the strict national debt limits “a danger to Italians because it only takes into account the total deficit and not the direction it has been heading.”[On the subject of protectionism, Letta called for the European Commission to take greater action: “We need the ‘European umbrella’ to fight protectionism [e.g. in France and Spain], which is the result of globalization fears, and which calls for strong political leadership to avoid the temptation of protectionism.” Nonetheless, he seems prone to some protectionist impulses himself: On the topic of free trade between the EU and China, Letta said Italy “needs to be firm on the EU quota policy… to allow our textile industry the time to reorganize itself.” Letta led the liberalization of the gas market in Italy and demonstrated a pronounced openness towards Russia: “There is no harm in pushing new organic alliances with the Russians,”e.g. between Italian-owned Enel and Russian Gazprom.

Letta can best be described as moderately pro-American, but he has not been shy of criticizing US policies. Discussing the situation in Iraq in Nov. 2004, Letta called for “a new [Italian] strategy in the fight against terrorism because the US strategy has failed.” At another point, he said that “Clearly we don’t want to aid the victory of fundamentalism and we cannot leave that country in the hands of beheaders. But …politics is made of realism and the proportionality of means and ends…We should plan for a gradual withdrawal to allow for [transition], but I have no doubts that we must indeed withdraw.” But Letta has not come out strongly in favor of Turkish accession; he has only said that Mediterranean question should be addressed after Eastern enlargement.

∙ Center-Right

Before becoming a government spokesman for Forza Italia in 2008, Daniele Capezzone served as party secretary of the Partito Radicale Italiano (2001-2006). When appointed, he was the youngest party secretary in Italy; he also served as president of the parliamentary Commission on Industry and Productive Activities. Capezzone’s ideological affinities are not clear-cut, and he insists he would support any party of left or right that espoused his policy priorities.He has been described as a “die-hard pro-American politician.”In an interview, he said “I was one of the few in Italy to point out that Neocons do not eat babies.” Capezzone has come out in favor of the entry of Israel into the EU and NATO. While president of the parliamentary commission on industry, Capezzone has pursued a strict pro-business agenda. When asked what ministerial  post he would choose to assume if given the opportunity, Capezzone answered ministry of industry or competition; his priority would be the “opening of markets” and to create policies that match the reality of small businesses in Italy, which in his estimation represent 98% of all commercial activity.

Internationally, Capezzone has reached out to opposition movements in communist and other countries through his activism in the Transnational Radical Party, which has NGO status in the UN, to “use nonviolent means to create an effective body if international law with respect for individuals and the affirmation of democracy and freedom throughout the world.”Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Capezzone strongly defended the U.S, and voiced his outrage at “pacifists’” and far left activists’ burning of US/UK flags: “We [in the PRI] raise those flags high – they are flags of freedom and democracy yesterday as today.He later criticized hypocrisy of the same pacifists who “defended liberty and freedom in the name of Arab regimes which ignore those principles." He has said that the Center-Left is “too anti-American” for his tastes and that the Center-Right had made the “correct choices”; he particularly resented the notion that the Italian government would maintain an “equidistant” relationship between Israel and Hezbollah. “I find it disconcerting that some of the most important members of [the center-left] government continue to use the term of Italian ‘neutrality’ on the  subject of the Middle East conflict.” He welcomed the “change in the traditional Italian line on Israel and the Atlantic axis over recent years, and [Italy’s] pro-Arab stances and subordination to the Franco-German axis have been cast aside.  However, once you have chosen your playing field, you have to play the game, not just act the majorette.”[He has also argued that Italy did not receive enough in return from the US for its partnership in Iraq. Capezzone has criticized American handling of Iraq, but believes that is only one front of an important, larger war: “we are clearly before a regional match that will not only be won or lost in Baghdad but in Tehran, Damascus and Riyadh.”

∙ Right

Gaetano Quagliariello was elected Senator (from Tuscany) in 2006 from Forza Italia. He is a university professor and also serves as president of the Magna Carta foundation. Quagliariello worries about the decline of Catholic identity in the West, he is favorable to a close alliance with the US and wary of European nations’ attempts to carve out a separate sphere of influence. As such he is in favor of EU integration, yet warns that closeness to EU could undermine Italy’s relationship with the US. He does not hold out high hopes for European unity in foreign and defense policy. “It remains to be seen whether Europe will manage to coalesce to such an extent as to increase its relative weight on the front of the defense of the West, without overreaching itself, or - which would seem more likely at the moment - whether it will move in a jumble and thereby oblige the United States to avail themselves, once again, of the [selective] coalition-based approach they followed during the Iraqi war.” Quagliariello still sees significant political and economic obstacles to real European unification. He argues that Turkish accession would mean an end to all dreams of a politically unified Europe, or indeed of a Europe that has any influence beyond its borders. But even more worrisome for him is Europeans’ gradual distancing from the US in times of peace, which show that “only external dangers justified the alliance.”After the decline of the French-German axis in European integration, Quagliariello views Italy’s choice as either to be “the weakest of the big countries or the strongest of the small countries.”

Quagliariello has expressed fears that a Europe “without roots”cannot confront Islamic fundamentalism and said that “any discussion of Western and European identity cannot ignore the fundamental role played by Judeo-Christian culture.” With regard to the issue of “exporting democracy,” he bemoans the declining appreciation of the linkage between Christianity and democracy. “The spread of democracy has been understood merely as the exportation of procedures with an insufficient regard for its foundations and principles. This creates the dangerous pairing of democracy with relativism, which grants popular sovereignty even to dictators and terrorist groups.” He is “perplexed by the purely procedural, electoral” definition as it has been applied in Iraq and Palestine, where democratization has “legitimized fundamentally anti-democratic forces.” His views on the Middle East show his support for Israel in a dangerous neighborhood: “The new Iranian presidency's nuclear challenge coupled with its explicit anti-Semitic and anti-Western drift is challenging the European policy based on dialogue at all costs, as well as the belief that appeasement can defuse the danger of a connection between fundamentalist countries and Islamic terrorism.”

On the subject of transatlantic relations, Quagliariello writes that “We must endow substance and duration to a Neo-Atlantic foreign policy that combines a stronger relationship with the US with a new Europeanism that is no longer in competition with the US, along with a new national autonomy in the Mediterranean basin.” He is highly skeptical of exporting democracy abroad. In Italian foreign policy debates, he considers himself a “classic Atlanticist” in the model of De Gasperi, Martino, Spadolino and Berlusconi (as opposed to a “heretical Atlanticist in the model of Giulio Andreotti or Massimo D’Alema): his worldview is “closer to Fukuyama than to Huntington.”

Conclusion

This article is a short preview at how the next generation of leaders might interact with the world they inherit. As discussed, these new leaders are impatient with institutional blockage in the EU, yet they are not at all nostalgic for Franco-German predominance of community institutions. They work on behalf of a "Europe of the regions" as well as for enlarging the region of Europe. This has led some of them to take surprising positions, such as supporting Israel's entry into NATO and/or the EU; but they are, predictably, split on the question of Turkish accession. Nonetheless, they engage their neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East without any hint of post-colonial shame – including in enduring areas of Italian influence such as Albania and Libya. However, most of them maintain an intense belief in the transformative powers of the EU, as well as an acute awareness of how Italy’s underdeveloped regions have benefited from EU programs and funds. If anything, the summary of their views is emblematic of a general re-shifting towards national positions across Europe, in the absence of an EU mandate for common foreign and defense policy. They have in common an intense desire to capitalize on Italy’s geographic position at the center of the Mediterranean, and they identify a national interest in taking advantage of that leverage in the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East.